Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin on Free Will and Predestination Desiderius Erasmus, On Free Will
From Erasmus — Luther: Discourse on Free Will, trans. and ed. by Ernst F. Winter (New York: Frederick Unger, 1961).
Ch. II, Sec. 13 – By freedom of the will we understand in this connection the power of the human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation.
Luther, The Bondage of the Will
Translated by Henry Cole
Found at http://www.covenanter.org/Luther/Bondage/bow_toc.htm
Sec. VI – THE "Form" of Christianity set forth by you, among other
things, has this - "That we should strive with all our powers, have
recourse to the remedy of repentance, and in all ways try to gain the mercy of
God; without which, neither human will, nor endeavour,
is effectual." Also, "that no one should despair of
pardon from a God by nature most merciful." -
These statements of yours are without Christ, without the Spirit, and more
cold than ice: so that, the beauty of your eloquence is really deformed by
them. Perhaps a fear of the Popes and those tyrants,
extorted them from you their miserable vassal, lest you should appear to them a
perfect atheist. But what they assert is this - That there is ability in us;
that there is a striving with all our powers; that there is mercy in God; that
there are ways of gaining that mercy; that there is a God, by nature just, and
most merciful, &c. - But if a man does not know what these powers are; what
they can do, or in what they are to be passive; what their efficacy, or what
their inefficacy is; what can such an one do? What will you set him about
doing?
"It is irreligious, curious, and superfluous, (you say) to wish to
know, whether our own will does any thing in those things which pertain unto
eternal salvation, or whether it is wholly passive under the work of
grace." - But here, you say the contrary: that it is Christian piety to
"strive with all the powers;" and that, "without the mercy of
God the will is ineffective."
Here you plainly assert, that the will does
something in those things which pertain unto eternal salvation, when you speak
of it as striving: and again, you assert that it is passive, when you say, that
without the mercy of God it is ineffective. Though, at the same time, you do
not define how far that doing, and being passive, is to be understood: thus,
designedly keeping us in ignorance how far the mercy of God extends, and how
far our own will extends; what our own will is to do, in that which you enjoin,
and what the mercy of God is to do. Thus, that prudence of yours, carries you
along; by which, you are resolved to hold with neither side, and to escape
safely through Scylla and Charybdis; in order that,
when you come into the open sea, and find yourself overwhelmed and confounded
by the waves, you may have it in your power, to assert all that you now deny,
and deny all that you now assert.
Sec. IX – THIS, therefore, is also essentially necessary and
wholesome for Christians to know: That God foreknows nothing by contingency,
but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His immutable,
eternal, and infallible will. By this thunderbolt, "Free-will" is
thrown prostrate, and utterly dashed to pieces. Those, therefore, who would
assert "Free-will," must either deny this thunderbolt, or pretend not
to see it, or push it from them. But, however, before I establish this point by
any arguments of my own, and by the authority of Scripture, I will first set it
forth in your words.
Are you not then the person, friend Erasmus, who just now asserted, that God
is by nature just, and by nature most merciful? If this be true, does it not
follow that He is immutably just and merciful? That, as His nature is
not changed to all eternity, so neither His justice nor His mercy
? And what is said concerning His justice and His mercy,
must be said also concerning His knowledge, His wisdom, His goodness, His will,
and His other Attributes. If therefore these things are asserted religiously,
piously, and wholesomely concerning God, as you say yourself, what has come to
you, that, contrary to your own self, you now assert, that it is irreligious,
curious, and vain, to say, that God foreknows of necessity? You openly declare
that the immutable will of God is to be known, but you forbid the
knowledge of His immutable prescience. Do you believe that He foreknows
against His will, or that He wills in ignorance? If then, He foreknows,
willing, His will is eternal and immovable, because His nature is so: and, if
He wills, foreknowing, His knowledge is eternal and immovable, because His
nature is so.
Sec. XXIV – God has promised certainly His grace to the humbled: that is, to the self-deploring and despairing. But a man cannot be thoroughly humbled, until he comes to know that his salvation is utterly beyond his own powers, counsel, endeavours, will, and works, and absolutely depending on the will, counsel, pleasure, and work of another, that is, of God only. For if, as long as he has any persuasion that he can do even the least thing himself towards his own salvation, he retain a confidence in himself and do not utterly despair in himself, so long he is not humbled before God; but he proposes to himself some place, some time, or some work, whereby he may at length attain unto salvation. But he who hesitates not to depend wholly upon the good-will of God, he totally despairs in himself, chooses nothing for himself, but waits for God to work in him; and such an one, is the nearest unto grace, that he might be saved.
These things, therefore, are openly proclaimed for the sake of the Elect: that, being by these means humbled and brought down to nothing, they might be saved. The rest resist this humiliation; nay, they condemn the teaching of self desperation; they wish to have left a little something that they may do themselves. These secretly remain proud, and adversaries to the grace of God. This, I say, is one reason - that those who fear God, being humbled, might know, call upon, and receive the grace of God. …
This is the highest degree of faith - to believe that He is merciful, who saves so few and damns so many; to believe Him just, who according to His own will, makes us necessarily damnable, that He may seem, as Erasmus says, 'to delight in the torments of the miserable, and to be an object of hatred rather than of love.' If, therefore, I could by any means comprehend how that same God can be merciful and just, who carries the appearance of so much wrath and iniquity, there would be no need of faith. But now, since that cannot be comprehended, there is room for exercising faith, while such things are preached and openly proclaimed: in the same manner as, while God kills, the faith of life is exercised in death.
Sec. XXV – AS to the other paradox you mention, - that, 'whatever is done by
us, is not done by Free-will, but from mere necessity'
-
Let us briefly consider this, lest we should suffer any thing most
perniciously spoken, to pass by unnoticed. Here then, I observe, that if it be
proved that our salvation is apart from our own strength and counsel, and
depends on the working of God alone, (which I hope I shall clearly prove
hereafter, in the course of this discussion,) does it not evidently follow,
that when God is not present with us to work in us, every thing that we do is
evil, and that we of necessity do those things which are of no avail unto
salvation? For if it is not we ourselves, but God only, that works salvation in
us, it must follow, whether or no, that we do nothing unto salvation before the
working of God in us.
But, by necessity, I do not mean compulsion; but (as they term
it) the necessity of immutability, not of compulsion; that is, a
man void of the Spirit of God, does not evil against his will as by violence,
or as if he were taken by the neck and forced to it, in the same way as a thief
or cut-throat is dragged to punishment against his will; but he does it
spontaneously, and with a desirous willingness. And this willingness and desire
of doing evil he cannot, by his own power, leave off, restrain, or change; but
it goes on still desiring and craving. And even if he should be compelled by
force to do any thing outwardly to the contrary, yet the craving will within
remains averse to, and rises in indignation against that which forces or
resists it. But it would not rise in indignation, if it were changed, and made
willing to yield to a constraining power. This is what we mean by the necessity
of immutability:- that the will cannot change itself,
nor give itself another bent; but rather the more it is resisted, the more it
is irritated to crave; as is manifest from its indignation. This would not be
the case if it were free, or had a
"Free-will." Ask experience, how hardened against all persuasion they
are, whose inclinations are fixed upon any one thing. For if they yield at all,
they yield through force, or through something attended with greater advantage;
they never yield willingly. And if their inclinations be not thus fixed, they
let all things pass and go on just as they will.
But again, on the other hand, when God works in us, the will, being
changed and sweetly breathed on by the Spirit of God, desires and acts, not
from compulsion, but responsively, from pure willingness,
inclination, and accord; so that it cannot be turned another way by any thing
contrary, nor be compelled or overcome even by the gates of hell; but it still
goes on to desire, crave after, and love that which is good; even as before, it
desired, craved after, and loved that which was evil. This, again, experience
proves. How invincible and unshaken are holy men, when, by violence and other
oppressions, they are only compelled and irritated the more to crave after
good! Even as fire, is rather fanned into flames than extinguished, by the
wind. So that neither is there here any willingness, or
"Free-will," to turn itself into another direction, or to desire any
thing else, while the influence of the Spirit and grace of God remain in the
man.
In a word, if we be under the god of this world, without the operation and
Spirit of God, we are led captives by him at his will, as Paul saith. (2 Tim. ii. 26.) So that,
we cannot will any thing but that which he wills. For he is that "strong
man armed," who so keepeth his palace, that
those whom he holds captive are kept in peace, that they might not cause any
motion or feeling against him; otherwise, the kingdom of Satan, being divided
against itself, could not stand; whereas, Christ affirms it does stand. And all
this we do willingly and desiringly, according to the
nature of will: for if it were forced, it would
be no longer will. For compulsion is (so to speak) unwillingness. But
if the "stronger than he" come and overcome him, and take us as His
spoils, then, through the Spirit, we are His servants and captives (which is
the royal liberty) that we may desire and do, willingly, what He wills.
Thus the human will is, as it were, a beast between the two. If God sit
thereon, it wills and goes where God will: as the Psalm saith,
"I am become as it were a beast before thee, and
I am continually with thee." (Ps. lxxiii.
22-23.) If Satan sit thereon, it wills and goes as Satan will. Nor is it in the
power of its own will to choose, to which rider it will run, nor which it will
seek; but the riders themselves contend, which shall have and hold it.
Sec. CLXVII – I SHALL here draw this book to a conclusion: prepared
if it were necessary to pursue this Discussion still farther. Though I consider that I have now abundantly satisfied the godly
man, who wishes to believe the truth without making resistance. For if
we believe it to be true, that God fore-knows and fore-ordains all things; that
He can be neither deceived nor hindered in His Prescience and Predestination;
and that nothing can take place but according to His Will, (which reason
herself is compelled to confess;) then, even according to the testimony of
reason herself, there can be no "Free-will" - in man, - in angel, -
or in any creature!
John Calvin, Institutes of Religion
Translated by Henry Beveridge
Found at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.toc.html
Book II, Ch. IV, Sec. 1 – That man is so enslaved by the yoke of sin, that he cannot of his own nature aim at good either in wish or actual pursuit, has, I think, been sufficiently proved. Moreover, a distinction has been drawn between compulsion and necessity, making it clear that man, though he sins necessarily, nevertheless sins voluntarily. But since, from his being brought into bondage to the devil, it would seem that he is actuated more by the devil's will than his own, it ja necessary, first, to explain what the agency of each is, and then solve the question,1 Whether in bad actions anything is to be attributed to God, Scripture intimating that there is some way in which he interferes ? Augustine (in Psalm xxxi. and xxxiii.) compares the human will to a horse preparing to start, and God and the devil the riders. "If God mounts, he, like a temperate and skilful rider, guides it calmly, urges it when too slow, reins it in when too fast, curbs its forwardness and over-action, checks its bad temper, and keeps it on the proper course; but if the devil has seized the saddle, like an ignorant and rash rider, he hurries it over broken ground, drives it into ditches, dashes it over precipices, spurs it into obstinacy or fury." With this simile, since a better does not occur, we shall for the present be contented. When it is said, then, that the will of the natural man is subject to the power of the devil, and is actuated by him, the meaning is, not that the will, while reluctant and resisting, is forced to submit (as masters oblige unwilling slaves to execute their orders), but that, fascinated by the impostures of Satan, it necessarily yields to his guidance, and does him homage. Those whom the Lord favours, not with the direction of his Spirit, he, by a righteous judgment, consigns to the agency of Satan.
Bk. III, Ch. XXI, Sec. 1 – The covenant of life is not preached
equally to all, and among those to whom it is
preached, does not always meet with the same reception. This diversity displays
the unsearchable depth of the divine judgment, and is without doubt subordinate
to God’s purpose of eternal election. But if it is plainly owing to the mere
pleasure of God that salvation is spontaneously offered to some, while others
have no access to it, great and difficult questions immediately arise,
questions which are inexplicable, when just views are not entertained
concerning election and predestination. To many this seems a perplexing
subject, because they deem it most incongruous that of the great body of
mankind some should be predestinated to salvation, and
others to destruction. How ceaselessly they entangle themselves will appear as
we proceed. We may add, that in the very obscurity
which deters them, we may see not only the utility of this doctrine, but also
its most pleasant fruits. We shall never feel persuaded as we ought that our
salvation flows from the free mercy of God as its fountain, until we are made
acquainted with his eternal election, the grace of God being illustrated by the
contrast—viz. that he does not adopt all promiscuously to the hope of
salvation, but gives to some what he denies to others. It is plain how greatly
ignorance of this principle detracts from the glory of God, and impairs true
humility. But though thus necessary to be known, Paul declares that it cannot
be known unless God, throwing works entirely out of view, elect those whom he
has predestined. His words are, “Even so then at this present time also, there
is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no
more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it
is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work,” (Rom. 11:6). If
to make it appear that our salvation flows entirely from the good mercy of God,
we must be carried back to the origin of election, then those who would
extinguish it, wickedly do as much as in them lies to obscure what they ought
most loudly to extol, and pluck up humility by the very roots. Paul clearly
declares that it is only when the salvation of a remnant is ascribed to
gratuitous election, we arrive at the knowledge that
God saves whom he wills of his mere good pleasure, and does not pay a debt, a
debt which never can be due. Those who preclude access, and would not have any
one to obtain a taste of this doctrine, are equally unjust to God and men,
there being no other means of humbling us as we ought, or making us feel how
much we are bound to him. Nor, indeed, have we elsewhere any sure ground of
confidence. This we say on the authority of Christ, who, to deliver us from all
fear, and render us invincible amid our many dangers, snares and mortal
conflicts, promises safety to all that the Father has taken under his
protection (John 10:26).
From this we infer, that all who know not that they are the peculiar people of
God, must be wretched from perpetual trepidation, and that those therefore,
who, by overlooking the three advantages which we have noted, would destroy the
very foundation of our safety, consult ill for themselves and for all the
faithful. What? Do we not here find the very origin of the Church, which, as
Bernard rightly teaches (Serm. in Cantic). could not be found or recognized among
the creatures, because it lies hid (in both cases wondrously) within the lap of
blessed predestination, and the mass of wretched condemnation?
But before I enter on the subject, I have some remarks to address
to two classes of men. The subject of predestination, which in itself is
attended with considerable difficulty is rendered very
perplexed and hence perilous by human curiosity, which cannot be restrained
from wandering into forbidden paths and climbing to the clouds determined if it
can that none of the secret things of God shall remain unexplored. When we see
many, some of them in other respects not bad men, every where rushing into this
audacity and wickedness, it is necessary to remind them of the course of duty
in this matter. First, then, when they inquire into predestination, let then
remember that they are penetrating into the recesses of the divine wisdom,
where he who rushes forward securely and confidently, instead of satisfying his
curiosity will enter in inextricable labyrinth. For
it is not right that man should with impunity pry into things which the Lord
has been pleased to conceal within himself, and scan that sublime eternal
wisdom which it is his pleasure that we should not apprehend but adore, that
therein also his perfections may appear. Those secrets of his will, which he
has seen it meet to manifest, are revealed in his word—revealed in so far as he
knew to be conducive to our interest and welfare.
Bk. III, Ch. XXI, Sec. 5 – The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and adjudges others to eternal death, no man who would be thought pious ventures simply to deny; but it is greatly caviled at, especially by those who make prescience its cause. We, indeed, ascribe both prescience and predestination to God; but we say, that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former (see chap. 22 sec. 1). When we attribute prescience to God, we mean that all things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; that to his knowledge there is no past or future, but all things are present, and indeed so present, that it is not merely the idea of them that is before him (as those objects are which we retain in our memory), but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his immediate inspection. This prescience extends to the whole circuit of the world, and to all creatures. By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.