Philosophy 1 Fall 2002

Study Questions for Exam #1

The following questions are not the same questions that will appear on the midterm exam. These study questions are merely intended to help you study for the midterm. The midterm exam will consist of 2 essay responses (there will be some choice). It is scheduled for the class period on Friday, October 25, and will be in 105 Dartmouth.

We are scheduling some extra office hours next week:

Professor Driver: Wednesday morning, 10-12, Thursday afternoon, 2-4:30

Professor Gilliland: Wednesday afternoon 2-5 p.m.

Also, feel free to blitz questions, or arrange for an appointment if you'd like to ask questions but can't make it during the scheduled times.

1. According to Anselm, why does the definition of God as the greatest conceivable being entail that God exists?

2. What is Gaunilo's objection to the ontological argument, and how might Anselm respond?

3. According to Rowe, what are the two different senses of 'possibility'? How does he use this distinction to criticize the ontological argument?

4. Why is the argument from design a posteriori rather than a priori? Also be able explain why the argument is inductive.

5. Be able to present the argument from design and critically discuss it.

6. Be able to explain why evil is a problem for the design argument.

7. Be able to explain why evil poses a logical problem for God's existence, given the very definition of God.

8. Why is the distinction between evil due to free will and natural evil an important one?

9. What is the difference between a first order good (or evil) and a second order good (or evil)?

10. Why does Mackie believe that one popular response to the problem of evil treats freedom as a third order good?

11. Be able to discuss responses to the problem of evil, and also be able to critically evaluate the responses.

12. Explain how Clifford uses his claim that it is wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence to argue that religious belief is irrational.

13. What is James' theory about the nature of our basic beliefs? Why is it a criticism of Clifford's claim in Question 13?

14. According to James, what is a genuine option and how does this limit the number of beliefs that we can rationally accept merely on the basis of the will? In your view, are there any beliefs that are irrational despite the fact that they are genuine options for some people?

15. How does a Hard Determinist differ from a Soft Determinist? How does each differ from a Libertarian?

16. Does Holbach think that a person who can act on his or her desires is more free than a person constrained by obstacles? Why or why not?

17. What is Holbach's general response to the claim that a particular act is free?

18. How does Ayer attempt to show that determinism does not undermine moral responsibility?

19. How does Ayer argue that causal determination does not equal constraint?

20. Why, according to Chisholm, does the Soft Determinist’s hypothetical analysis of “could have done otherwise” fail?

21. Explain Chisholm’s theory of agent causation. What is the common objection to this theory, and how does Chisholm respond?

22. How does Frankfurt argue that moral responsibility is compatible with Hard Determinism? How broadly can this conception of moral responsibility be applied?