Philosophy 1: Exam # 1 Answer Key
SECTION 1: TRUE OR FALSE.
1. False
2. False
3. False
4. False
5. False
6. False
7. False
8. False
9. False
10. True
11. False
12. True
13. False
SECTION 2: SHORT ANSWER.
(a) The Merchant’s Thumb Principle
(i) Suppose there is
a fact for which there is no known explanation.
(ii) Suppose that we can think of a possible
explanation such that if only it were true then it would be a very good
explanation.
In
that case it is wrong to say that this fact stands in no more need of
explanation than does any other equiprobable
possibility for which no similar explanation is available.
(b) The Likelihood Principle
The observation O strongly favors hypothesis 1 over hypothesis 2 if and only if the chance of O given h1 is much higher than the chance of O given h2. In symbols:
O strongly favors h1 over h2 iff Pr(O/h1) >> Pr(O/h2)
(c) The “Ivanesque” Argument from Evil
(1) If our moral sensibilities are sound concerning the suffering of innocents, then the suffering of innocents is unjustifiable.
(2) If the suffering of innocents is unjustifiable, then there is no omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being.
(3) Our moral sensibilities are sound concerning the suffering of innocents.
(4) So, there is no omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being.
(d) An argument is valid if and only if
it is impossible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
SECTION 3: MULTIPLE CHOICE.
1. Which of the following statements must a present-day defender of a Paley-style design argument reject?
(e) There
is only one possible way the world could have been.
2. Both the evidential argument from evil and the argument from design are
(d) likelihood arguments.
3. According to Sober, the target of a firing squad who survives when every single bullet misses
(a) is subject to an observational selection effect that weakens
his or her epistemic situation relative to that of the bystander.
4. According to Gould, the panda’s thumb
(c) favors
5. It was suggested in lecture that on the “old” conception of the world according to which the physical universe consists of matter and motion,
(c) it is not possible to frame the question “How probable is it
that the universe would satisfy the basic physical conditions required for the
evolution of intelligent life?” in a sharp enough way to allow for a meaningful
answer.
6. Suppose you learn that someone has won the lottery. You infer that it is more likely that there are many players in this lottery than that there is only one player in this lottery. On Sober’s view, in reasoning that way you are
(e) none of the above.
7. According to van Inwagen, the probability of the actual patterns of suffering in the world on theism is:
(e) none of the
above
8. Van Inwagen claims that
(c) for all anyone knows, massive irregularity is a defect in a
world at least as great as the defect of containing patterns of suffering
morally equivalent to those in this world.
9. One objection to van Inwagen’s defense discussed in class is that it contradicts the apparently true claim that
(c) we do know that
there is a morally decisive reason
for intervening in an actual case of the suffering of innocents.
10. The evidential argument from evil attempts to establish that
(b) it is not rational to accept theism because theism is
inconsistent with the hypothesis of indifference and, relative to our epistemic
situation, the hypothesis of indifference is epistemically
preferable to theism.
11. Van Inwagen claims that
(a) evil constitutes a difficulty for theism but not evidence
against theism.
12. According to van Inwagen, in order to construct a successful theodicy against the evidential argument from evil one must show that
(c) in light of the theodicy, the actual patterns of suffering
in the world are just what we should expect given theism.
SECTION 4: SHORT ANSWER: The Design Dialectic.
1. The theory of evolution provides an account of the world (i.e. of organic fine tuning) on which it is conceivable that the world is the result of “random forces”—in the sense of blind mechanisms that select outcomes from a variety of randomly generated possibilities. This undercuts the second premise in Paley’s argument. (One could also say that the theory of evolution provides a third alternative to (purely) random forces and intelligent design, so Paley’s argument proceeds from a false dichotomy.)
2. A variety of possible answers would work
here. These are just examples.
a. the right materials: e.g., water, carbon and other organic compounds
b. local sunlight energy to drive replication
c. limited local supplies of replication resources to ensure competition among replicators
3. A variety of possible answers would work
here as well. These are just examples.
a. proper ratios among particle masses (E.g., mass of neutron – mass of proton ≈ 2 x mass of electron.)
b. proper strengths and relative ratios among the fundamental forces (gravity, strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetic force)
c. main sequence white/yellow stars
4. a. Intelligent Design, b. Plurality of Worlds, c. Necessity
5. Necessity. Since the values of the physical constants have to be “filled in by hand” or determined through empirical study, it appears that they are contingent or could have had many different possible values. So it does not seem that the hypothesis of necessity is correct.
6. Plurality of worlds. Our total evidence includes the fact that it is OUR world, THIS world, that is fine-tuned, and the principle tells us this must be included in our observed evidence. But the chance that THIS world be fine tuned is no more likely on the Plurality hypothesis than on the single world hypothesis. (To think otherwise is to commit the inverse gambler’s fallacy.)
7. The distinction between epistemically corrosive and epistemically innocent OSEs. A corrosive OSE is one that skews the observed evidence by determining what that evidence is. An innocent OSE does not play a role in determining what the evidence is, and arguably does not skew it. In the firing squad case, the prisoner is subject only to an innocent OSE.
8. One might suggest that one’s own case can be treated not as a special and epistemically compromised observation but like any randomly selected instance, and thus the fact that THIS world is fine-tuned can be treated as if it were merely the fact that SOME world is fine-tuned. We are then not forced into committing the inverse gambler’s fallacy if we postulate a plurality of worlds to explain the fine-tuning.
9. We do not (at the moment) have any grounds upon which to frame a new question about the probabilities that the laws of physics would of the sort that could a permit life-sustaining universe. For that we’d need some precise “hyperphysics” or something, and we don’t have it.
SECTION 5: MISCELLANEOUS.
1. Draper had claimed that either theism had to be shown to be much more likely than it appears to be, or else the hypothesis of indifference had to be shown to be much less likely than it appears to be. Van Inwagen’s strategy is, instead, to show that we are not in the position to assign any likelihood to theism at all. This undercuts the premise that theism is much less likely than the hypothesis of indifference.
2. It doesn’t tell you to do anything. In this case, each of the possible outcomes would have an explanation associated with it that is parallel to any that might be given for the actual outcome. The MTP only applies in cases in which the actual outcome is unique (or at least among a very small range) among the possible outcomes in having a special explanation available.
3. Sober says that Gould, like Paley, attempts to assign a likelihood to a certain observation given a hypothesis about God, or a god-like intelligent designer. But we can’t reasonably make any such assignment, since we don’t know what to expect, or to predict, on the hypothesis of such a designer.
4. The FWD claims that God is justified in allowing evil in order to preserve the free will of creatures to make moral choices—including the choice of whether to do evil. The FWD could NOT justify God in allowing all the forms of evil we observe, however, since it doesn’t account for natural evils—evils that arise in nature but not from the free actions of moral agents. (Or, arguably, yes, the FWD could account for all evils, provided that it can be denied that so-called natural evils are really cases of evil. If all forms of evil are moral evils, then the FWD might account for them all.)